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coastal or freshwater marshes and wetlands due to public works
activities. Here, the court found that ACE was correct regarding the
standard of review, but the Division satisfied the requirement through
its discussion of other standards. Nonetheless, the court held that the
Division took a hard look at the local coastal management program
policies, even though it failed to mention them explicitly.
Therefore, the Alaska Supreme Court determined that AIA's
proposal contained sufficient information for the Division to conduct
a satisfactory consistency review. Further, the court affirmed the
Division's determination that AIA's proposed airport expansion
project satisfied all requirements for development of coastal areas
under the state and local coastal management programs.
DaraLur

ARKANSAS
Ark. River Rights v. Echubby Lake Hunting Club, No. CA03-389, 2003
Ark. App. LEXIS 786 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 29, 2003) (holding summary
judgment improper when questions of material fact remained
regarding public prescriptive easement and navigability of the waters
over Echubby Area).
Echubby Lake Hunting Club ("Club") purchased the Echubby
Areas (the Echubby chute, Echubby Lake, a ditch connecting the
chute to the Echubby Lake, and a small lake in the Coal Pile area)
from the Chicago Mill and Lumber Company in 2001 as part of a 2400acre land acquisition. Although the Echubby Area is currently covered
by water, until the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
constructed the Lock and Dam No. 2 ("Dam") on the Arkansas River
in the 1960s, the Echubby Area was not accessible from the Arkansas
River. Shortly after its acquisition, the Club applied to the Corps for
permission to construct a crossing over part of the Echubby Area.
Because the proposed crossing would block public access to parts of
water within the Echubby Area, Arkansas River Rights Committee
("Group") adamantly opposed the crossing and claimed the public
had acquired a prescriptive right to use the water. As a result of the
Group's opposition, the Club filed a complaint in Lincoln County
Circuit Court ("trial court"), seeking a declaration indicating its
ownership of Echubby Areas was free and clear without any right of
access by the Group. The Group claimed that because the Echubby
Area waters were navigable and the public had been exercising open
and notorious control over the waters for the past seven years, the
Group had acquired a public prescriptive easement over the water.
Arguing that hunting and fishing rights cannot be acquired by
prescription and that navigability of the waters should be determined
by their natural state (thus before the dam), the Club filed a motion
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for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.
On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found summary
judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact
remained as to both whether the public had acquired a prescriptive
right and as to the navigability of the Echubby Area waters. The court
came to this decision by relying on a previous holding by the Arkansas
Supreme Court, which stated that once water from a navigable body
artificially covers a riparian owner's land without the owner's consent
for a sufficient length of time, the public acquires the right to use the
newly covered land. Thus, because the dam caused water from the
Arkansas River, which was navigable, to cover the Club's land without
its consent, questions as to the public's prescriptive right to the water
over the covered land remained.
Next, the court quickly rejected the Club's contentions that
conditions on the date of statehood determine navigability of a water
body and that the court should determine navigability by the condition
of the area before any improvements. Regarding the Club's first
contention, the court relied on a prior United States Supreme Court
precedent indicating that while navigability to fix ownership of a river
bed or riparian rights is determined as of the date of statehood,
navigability for other purposes, as was the case here, may arise later.
Regarding the Club's second contention, the court concluded the
current conditions of the Echubby Area were not due to any
improvements to the Echubby Area itself, but rather were secondary
effects from improvements to a different body of water, the Arkansas
River. Further, no precedent existed which requires closing water to
the public simply because it was rendered navigable through
improvements made to another body of water. Finding the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment when questions of material fact
remained regarding the public's prescriptive easement and the
navigability of the water, the court reversed and remanded the case for
further proceedings.
Aimee H. Wagstaff

CALIFORNIA
San Francisco Baykeeper v. California State Water Res. Control Bd.,
No. A08908, 2003 WL 21235472 (Cal. Ct. App. May 28, 2003) (holding
that in the period between a determination that a water body is an
impaired body under section 303 (d) of the Clean Water Act and the
development of a Total Maximum Daily Load for that particular
pollutant, an interim permit that allows an increase in the discharge of
a pollutant does not necessarily constitute a degradation of the level of
water quality needed to protect existing uses nor a degradation of the
existing beneficial uses violative of the antidegradation policy for a
Tier 1 water).

